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Chapter 4
Political Space: Half Empty? 
The Case of Hungary
Andrea Pet 6
Central European Univerisity, Budapest
Zoftân Vasali
King Sigismund College, Budapest
In post-democracy (Crouch 2004), new political programmes emerging from the re-articulation of the relationship between state and citizens 
are constructing new spaces. These new spaces are placing democratic 
actors in an opposing binary position to the establishment, which has 
a major impact on their performance. If our aim is to assess the level of 
social activism in the political space based on sociological and political 
scientific factors, to identify the factors that are known from interna­
tional research and yet which are also capable of describing the dynamics 
of trends in Hungary is a challenging task.
Specific conditions in Hungary
Since 2010 Hungary’s Christian-conservative coalition government, with 
a two-thirds parliamentary majority, has successfully constructed its own 
state-funded (pseudo) NGO sector by means of a policy of centralization 
that aims, according to the government, to promote good government 
and efficiency. The NGO sector established in this manner -  including 
the Peace March (Bekemenet) and associated organizations -  is not based 
on liberal values and human rights (Bekemenet utăn kisertetjaras 2012).
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The NGO sector, which had previously acted as a watchdog and 
a voice for human rights values in accordance with the principles of liberal 
democracy, has been fundamentally transformed and now struggles 
to respond effectively to [the government’s] fundamental structural 
positions which have broad support in society. In order to understand 
this phenomenon we need first and foremost to explain its motivation. 
Viktor Orbân’s resounding election victory in 2010 was preceded by 
a significant moral and economic crisis that called into question most of 
the ambitions and aims of the policy consensus that had been established 
in the wake of democratization in 1990 (Pogâtsa 2013). Indicative of 
this crisis was the failure -  manifest by 2010 -  of government policies 
towards the Roma and in such fields as equal opportunities, reforms to 
the education system and social security. U nder such circumstances, it 
became very difficult to represent norms that contrast positively with 
those represented by the government and the political parties, and then 
to generate social cooperation and put forward alternative policy options.
The consolidation of the Orbân government, one of whose aims 
has been to create a National Cooperation System, has profoundly 
affected social (NGO) activism in the country and has reinforced 
negative structural trends that experts had previously failed to spot. 
The government, consciously exploiting the norms of democracy for its 
own purposes and reconfiguring the social contract for the benefit of 
its own voter groups, ran up against an initial wave of protests against 
government policies in 2010 and 2011 (Petöcz 2012a). However, these 
civil society protests peaked in 2012 and 2013, since when activism has 
narrowed to the efforts of a small group of people who have sought to 
formulate the consequences and dangers of efforts by the government to 
undermine constitutional norms and who have been able to draw onto 
the streets those social groups sensitive to such dangers.
The new electoral system and the centralization and politicization of 
the distribution of state funds have forced the actors who organized the 
initial street protests to approach the opposition parties, as actors with 
a monopoly on political representation and resources. This development, 
however, is based on the acceptance of two premises: that the new 
electoral system is legitimate and that the imperative aim is to maximize 
the number of votes (for the opposition parties at the next election).
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The groups in question, motivated by their wish to avoid the systemic 
disaster that would result from their rejection of these two premises, 
have jeopardized their own credibility, given that they previously 
employed an anti-establishment rhetoric and argued in favor of a new 
beginning. Furthermore, they have now entered a public space where 
the norms of political expression leave very little room for authentic 
identity formation. The women’s movements (those with a human rights 
orientation), which watched critically as the new protest movements 
adopted uncritically the political elite’s male-dominated attitudes and 
positions, continue to value their independence from the political parties 
(despite earlier failures) and to uphold their watchdog function, relying 
principally on the institutional and normative power of the European 
Union. In the meantime, however, they have been rather unsuccessful in 
expanding their social support base and network.
International themes and domestic developments
Since the political changes of 1989/90, social development models have 
only partially succeeded in arousing interest in Hungary in the major 
problems that are being addressed internationally. W hether we are 
speaking of the uncontrolled influence over democratic states of the 
banks and other global financial actors, or of the ecological crisis that 
dates back to the 1970s, or of the issue of gender inequality, there has been 
no groundbreaking progress in the Hungarian NGO sector in terms of 
establishing standards and insisting on compliance with such standards. 
We might even say that a critique of globalization -  one that addresses 
both the ecological crisis and the objectives of the women’s movements 
and other anti-establishment groups -  has had only a minimal effect 
on the domestic political agenda. The strengthening -  after 2006 -  of 
racist and nationalist movements in Hungary offering anti-modernism 
as a real alternative to neo-liberal democracy and the market economy, 
coupled with the failure of attempts to adapt the Third-Way social 
democratic model, led to the marginalization [or, indeed, capitulation] 
of the democratic values of the Third Republic. Those actors that 
argued for the restoration of such values or launched a leftist critique of 
the weaknesses of the Third Republic in effect relinquished their social 
legitimacy.
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In seeking to determine the extent to which Occupy Wall Street 
(OWS) influenced the development of the opposition protests and 
movements in Hungary, we need to highlight two fundamental problems: 
first, the domestication in Hungarian politics of the topics addressed by 
OWS; second, the modification of OWS original goals and objectives. 
Simplifying, we may say that the movement launched in New York in 
September 2011 arose primarily as a response to the lack of democratic 
controls (and distributive norms) in the world of finance. This message 
was not new in Hungary, as various alternative and environmentalist 
movements (e.g., Protect the Future (Vedegylet), whose name derived 
from a 19th-century ethnocentric consumers movement, which had 
promoted Hungarian goods within the Habsburg Empire) had earlier 
employed similar themes to draw people onto the streets at the time of 
the WTO talks. O f course, such movements cannot be classified as mass 
movements and, regrettably, they failed to influence in a meaningful 
way public debates at the time. Even so, their message was “present” in 
Hungarian politics -  an achievement in itself in an East Central European 
society undergoing a drawn-out process of transition. It should also be 
noted that this political current was a factor in the choice of President of 
Hungary in 2005.
Worth highlighting is the importance of statements made by the 
governing party (Fidesz) on topics related to the financial system, for 
these stated positions have served to limit acceptance in society for 
messages like those of the OWS movement. Over the past four years, 
the governing parties have used their political mandate to portray the 
banks as the “major culprits” in the foreign-currency loan fiasco. In 
an increasingly impoverished society, there is inevitably a tendency 
to accept the simplified portrayal of such complex issues as a “battle 
between good and bad.” By 2013 the result in Hungary was that public 
discontent manifested in street protests became limited to actions by 
the “victims of foreign currency” (devizakărosultak), i.e. people who had 
taken out foreign currency loans in the hope of more favorable interest 
rates, but who were struggling to make their repayments after the value 
of the forint plummeted. Apart from a number of student occupations at 
universities, almost nothing was left of the critical objectives represented 
by the OWS movement. The mass introduction of foreign-currency loans 
dates to the period of the socialist-liberal government (2004-2010). This
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meant that a link could be made between international finance and the 
leftist governments of the period -  which had indeed pursued neoliberal 
economic policies. It also meant that the eight years of leftist government 
(a period marked by various policy shifts) could be treated as a single and 
uniform political era. At the same time, the principled stand taken by the 
OWS movement gave rise to an expectation that similar movements in 
the future would not seek links with political parties. However the OWS 
phenomenon did put down roots in Hungary, if only to a minimal extent. 
For instance, we could cite the Anonymous and OWS demonstration 
held in Budapest (as in 400 other cities around the world) on November 
5, 2013, which in Budapest drew no more than a few hundred activists 
wearing Guy Fawkes masks and protesting against the “lies of the banks, 
governments, political parties and media.” Although, when it comes to 
actions of this type, it is best to avoid relativizing the minimal level of 
public participation, nevertheless the slogan “We are the 99 percent!” 
inevitably draws our attention to the contradictions surrounding such 
initiatives. Among the social movements that may currently be regarded 
as significant actors in Hungary, we should highlight the Facebook group 
“One Million for Press Freedom in Hungary” (AftY/o1), the Student 
Network (Hal la2), and the Hungarian women’s movements -  all of 
which need to be explained, if we are to prove our assertion.
From the outset, the Milla demonstrations drew attention to the viola­
tion of the separation of powers, to the reduction in the transparency of 
decision-making, to the need to defend public non-governmental forums, 
and to restrictions on basic democratic rights (Boda & Csigo 2012). Pub­
lic consternation at the power aspirations of the Orbân government after 
2010 gave an impulse to the Milla movement, whose stated ambition was 
to become an NGO initiative that would serve as a counterweight to 
Fidesz and that would be politically independent and enjoy mass sup­
port.
“The PR expert and social activist Peter Juhâsz created the Facebook 
page on December 21,2010, following Parliament’s adoption of the media 
law the previous night and a m inute’s silence held by the Hungarian 
radio presenter Attila Mong in the morning of the same day in response
1 The Facebook page was created by Peter Juhâsz on December 21,2010.
2 A group nam ed” S tudent Network (Hallgatoi Hălozat) was formed as early as 2006, 
but it only became known nationally in the course of the organized protests in 2011.
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to the passage of the law. This was one of the most dramatic days of the 
22 years since the fall of communism.” (Petocz 2012a)
Given the limits of our analysis, we cannot describe in detail the rise 
and fall of the Milla movement. However, based on the previously defined 
criteria, we can assess its achievements and its effect on social movements 
in Hungary. The critical messages of Milla in the initial phase of its 
development drew attention to the dangers of the measures implemented 
by the Orbân government, most of which have now been revealed to 
the international community. Practical instances of this are the Tavares 
Report on the state of fundamental rights in Hungary (June 25, 2013), 
a report authored by the Green Party MEP Rui Ihvares on behalf of the 
European Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home 
Affairs, as well as the inquiries and hearings launched by the European 
Commission and by the European Parliament. The reactions of the 
Hungarian government to the Tavares Report arc difficult to take at face 
value, for the report does no more than describe the process by which the 
Orbân government dismantled the system of political institutions. And 
yet this process was none other than what had officially been formulated 
in the government’s programme as a policy of transforming Hungary in 
response to the global, European and Hungarian effects of the crisis.
The Milla movement also strove to sustain its mass appeal by 
strengthening diversity and offering support to NGO activists (Petocz 
2012b). Despite the polarization of the public life in Hungary and the 
Milla movement’s marginalization by the Orbân government’s National 
Cooperation System, the initiative achieved several important successes 
in what is a fundamentally apolitical and passive social milieu. In the space 
of 18 months, it reached the peak of its popularity, articulating major 
social and political issues. The question arose, however, as to whether 
(or to what extent) it would be able to maintain its independence from 
the political parties. The dilemma resulted in a rather odd pitfall: those 
who were confident of creating a new pole of opposition (one critical of 
the regime) assumed that action on the Internet and mass participation 
in protests could be channeled towards support for the democratic 
opposition parties, which were struggling to survive. This process 
jeopardized, however, the NGO character of the Milla movement as well 
as its independence from the political parties and its diversity. Thus, in 
2012, it was impossible to say whether the established and newly-formed
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leftist parties, the Greens or the Liberals would end up benefiting from 
the “people power” unleashed by Milla. When Milla subsequently joined 
the party alliance Together-PM (Együtt-PM) led by Gordon Bajnai, 
who had served as a minister in the Socialist-Liberal government and 
subsequently -  after the fall of that government -  as prime minister in 
the interim government of experts, it seemed that the issue had been 
decided. We now see that the strength and uniqueness of the Milla 
movement is crumbling in the face of the failure to form a political party.
The history of the Student Network (HaHa) goes back much further 
than the series of protests held in the 2012 academic year against the 
abolition of a guaranteed number of state-funded university places 
(Szabo 2012). It is no accident that the organization has been compared 
in the international press with the 1968 movement, as university students 
constitute its support base. Indeed, even though many university students 
in Hungary have right-wing or far-right sympathies, HaHa still managed 
to mobilize significant numbers of students for events held jointly with 
the official students’ representative body, the HÖOK. Founded in 2006, 
HaHa “banged on the doors of the same university where it later managed 
to gain a footing, attracting thousands of students to its forums from 
numerous educational institutions” (Hogyan keszült? A Forradalom 
2012). Regarding its aims, the organization was established with a view 
to offering alternatives to what it termed erroneous government 
policies, but as an organization it has managed to function on the 
basis of grassroots democratic principles. It has even established a free 
university where, among other things, the sexism present within the 
movement and in universities and other areas of academic life has been 
debated. Most importantly perhaps, HaHa succeeded in reaching out to 
other social and professional groups, thereby establishing solidarity and 
cooperation among the various NGO initiatives Network for Freedom 
in Education (Hâlozat a Tanszabadsdgfrt), Parents’ Network (Szülöi 
Hâlozat), and Lecturers’ Network (Oktatoi Hâlozat). That is to say, even 
though the Government’s communication strategy -  in the absence of 
any real counter-argument or readiness for negotiation or cooperation 
-  sought to write off HaHa as a movement with links to the leftist- 
liberal parties (Együtt-PM) and to call into question the organization’s 
representative legitimacy, HaHa’s supporters -  both teaching staff and 
students -  managed to set the domestic political agenda through street
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demonstrations in the cold of winter and through their occupation of 
university buildings. HaHa became quite evidently an independent and 
self-organizing movement. It soon advanced to the stage of cellular 
growth, forming smaller and larger groups around the country. In this 
way, it engendered a series of protests, which drew sustenance from the 
errors of government policy decision-makers in the field of education 
(Krastev 2013).
Regarding the internal operations of HaHa, it is worth highlighting 
that when planning and coordinating its actions, the organization has 
utilized the methods summarized in Occupation Cookbook, a publication 
authored by Croatian activists (Hogyan keszült? A  Forradalom 2012). 
We see, therefore, how HaHa successfully applied external models when 
seeking to consolidate its own organization. Interestingly, these models 
were not Western European ones, but were drawn from the Central 
European region. H ere an analogy may be made with the Polish women’s 
congress, which has served as a model for the women’s movements 
in Hungary. HaHa’s achievements were facilitated by its effective use 
of Loomio, an online collaborative decision-making platform built by 
a New Zealand team of developers. Use of the platform enabled HaHa 
to make grassroots democratic decisions via the Internet without having 
to organize meetings.
If we define the criteria of mobilization within the O WS framework as 
the making of anti-establishment statements, the occupation of spaces, 
grassroots democracy, an absence of formal leadership, spontaneous 
events, and the use of creative symbols, then we should also include in this 
group the street demonstration that took place in 2006 in the aftermath 
of the leaking of the then prime minister’s “secret” speech. The protests 
culminated with the occupation of Hungarian Television’s headquarters. 
This, however, proves our assertion that under Hungarian conditions 
caution must be shown when applying international norms and criteria as 
analytical categories. The same also applies to the women’s movement: 
although we might think that Hungary has accepted the principle of 
gender equality since becoming a member of the EU, this is far from 
being the case.
In Hungary party voting preferences influence women’s political 
mobilization. After 1989, women’s NGOs with a human rights orientation 
rejected any direct links with political parties; they wished to serve as
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watchdogs, while also consulting with the liberal party. After the liberal 
party (and its support base) was “invisibilized” in Hungarian politics 
(Pogâtsa 2013), this type of women’s activism found an ally in the Green 
Party (Lehet Mâs a Politika, I MP), which also has an urban middle-class 
base. The pillarization of the Hungarian political system was also mirrored 
in the representation and articulation of women’s interests at the NGQ 
level. The most effective way to get access to resources and polity making 
has been to cooperate with a particular party and to avoid bipartisan 
action on women’s issues (domestic violence, participation in politics and 
the economy) that are -  or should be -  above the logic of party cleavages.
The very weak women’s NGOs in Hungary constitute three separate 
umbrella organizations: socialist, liberal, and conservative-religious. 
In June 2013, these three umbrella organizations signed a declaration 
demanding parity on national party and European Parliamentary election 
lists (Összefoglalo: A  nok politikai reszvetele demokratikus ertek 2013). 
The term “parity” was chosen in lieu of “quota,” a term  that carries heavy 
ideological baggage (moreover, the last bipartisan action seeking the 
adoption of a quota law in Hungary had failed at the time of the leftist- 
liberal government, despite the support of several conservative women 
MPs). This declaration, signed by the three umbrella organizations, 
seemed to have created a new space for articulating the demand for 
more women in politics.
The story did not end well. When the declaration became known, the 
conservative umbrella organization ousted its successful and popular 
leader and withdrew its support for the Hungarian Women’s Congress, 
which was held on November 11, 2013 and was based on the very suc­
cessful Polish example. It has also declined to participate in the confer­
ences on women’s participation in politics organized by the OSCE and 
CEU. The declaration was only the second attempt since the Roundtable 
Discussions in 1988-1989 to redefine public interest across party lines. 
But it has failed due to party cleavages. Heti Välasz, a major conserva­
tive weekly, published a “fact-finding” article about how foreign enti­
ties, including the Open Society Institute and the Norwegian Embassy, 
were financing anti-government propaganda by way of women’s NGOs 
in Hungary (Heti Välasz, August 15, 2013, pp. 12-15).
Hungary has a low ranking on the Gender Equality Index. The recent 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
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Women report warned that nearly all fields of inquiry have remained 
largely ignored by the government (CEDAW 2013). In the EU, Hungary 
is at the bottom of the list in terms of women’s participation in politics. 
As an analysis of the electoral system proves, the new electoral law for 
the 2014 elections will further diminish the number of women in politics 
-w ith  the introduction of single majority districts.
The “women’s policies” of the national right-wing political parties all 
focus on the normative cult of motherhood. In  their political language, 
these parties refer to “family policy” rather than “women’s politics,” 
whereby the social role of women is normative motherhood. The 
liberal-leftist critique of the normative cult of motherhood places the 
emphasis on women’s individual human rights and the right to choose 
motherhood. This option includes the right to reject maternity -  which 
in the conservative discourse is regarded as “national” sabotage (Peto 
2010).
The illusion that 1989 would bring a general democratization to post­
communist Europe is over, and family policy is now used as a way of 
reinstating “old-new” divisions. As Duncan Light has pointed out in his 
analysis of post-communist identities, they are driven “by the desire to 
construct new post-communist identities, characterized by a democratic, 
pluralist, capitalist and largely westward-looking orientation.” (Light 
2000, p. 158). Attempts by the right wing to redefine women’s political 
space are not characterized by “a democratic, pluralist, capitalist and 
largely westward-looking orientation” but rather by an anti-pluralist un­
derstanding. The resurfacing anti-modernism in Eastern Europe, cou­
pled with criticism of the spiritual and social consequences of neoliberal 
capitalism, has also appropriated discourses concerning the family in or­
der to achieve its aim, namely to create a viable, livable and desirable al­
ternative. This space can be also connected to anti-modernist green poli­
tics and to the emerging far-right political forces (Peto 2012, pp. 130-8).
As far as gendered analysis is concerned, the concept of “New 
Woman” was labelled by Rita Felski in her work The Gender o f  Modernity 
as rendering women “prisoners of progress” (Felski 1995, pp. 11-33). In 
the rhetoric of the progressive women’s movement, women represent the 
new beginning, whereby the future is conceived as a normative project 
with a linear development. The historical meta-narrative about women’s 
past is hierarchical and exclusive, while aiming to forge a counter-identity.
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The discourse of the women’s movement is a strategic discourse which is 
emotionally charged. Its language is creating collective subjectivity with 
shared rituals, symbols of meanings and stories.
The political context and the proposed solutions
Social movements in Hungary have developed in a specific manner. As 
has been stated on many occasions, the country’s NGO sector is weak 
and vulnerable in terms of both public support and funding (Miszlivetz
2012) . The second Orbân government has strengthened the negative 
trend as part of a power-political game. By 2011 it had helped to establish 
a pseudo NGG movement enjoying mass support by means of state 
funding, with livelihoods provided by opaque interest groups and with 
populism-based party communication. It would be a mistake to question 
people’s identification with, and support for, such NGOs or to explain the 
process in terms of lavish state funding alone. The presence of the Peace 
March movement has transformed the interpretative framework, for this 
pro-government initiative -  which enjoys a level of mass support that is 
unprecedented in Europe -  well demonstrates the crisis of democratic 
norms that serves also to nurture the initiatives that form the subject of 
our investigation.
The movements investigated by us have sought to generate activism 
in a social milieu where people are difficult to activate even at the time 
of elections and have minimal knowledge of politics (and so can be easily 
influenced). Further, the value system of this milieu is closer to that of the 
East European authoritarian regimes (Ipsos 2013; FES-Policy Solutions
2013) . It is important to emphasize these points, because the successes and 
the failures can only be assessed and understood within these frameworks. 
These interrelationships are well exemplified by the co-occurrence -  in 
this situation the necessarily antagonistic co-occurrcnce -  of efforts to 
achieve autonomy from the political parties (a defining feature of such 
organizations) and of objectives seeking to effectively influence political 
decision-making. For this reason, it is particularly important that such 
domestic initiatives as Milla, HaHa, and Women’s Interest (Adz Erdek) 
have devoted significant energies -  based on international examples -  to 
maintaining their diversity and openness and to developing grassroots 
internal democratic structures, as a means of guaranteeing their long­
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term success. This is what Noi Erdek did when, on November 30, 2013, 
the conservative women’s movement, Interest Association of Hungarian 
Ladies (Magyar Asszonyok Erdekszövetsege), awarded its annual prize, 
the Golden Grain, to a journalist who is known for her denial of the 
Holocaust and for other extremist views (Nöszövetsegnek älcazott 
nâcisimogato, miniszterre 2013). When seeking to establish as researchers 
what practical (policy) solutions the initiatives under investigation have 
proposed to the problems we have raised, we should recognize that there 
is an important dividing line between political parties and NGOs. The 
dividing line is whether NGO’s can risk giving their support to a critique 
of the same liberal democracy that has been rejected by Fidesz (with its 
establishment of an alternative to such liberal democracy), as long as 
criticism of this anti-modernist and communitarian alternative is based 
on a rather wobbly theoretical framework.
Raising political issues and the international context
Reflecting on the campaign for the European Parliamentary election, 
we can identify with increasing clarity the international issues that have 
escaped Hungary’s attention and those that could be formulated for 
public consumption. In seeking to address the public, the NGOs find 
themselves in a very difficult and competitive situation, whereby their 
differentiated messages are often presented in oversimplified contexts. 
The exception is the issue of domestic violence (violence within the 
family), which the Fidesz government has managed -  with great difficulty 
-  to integrate into its own conceptual framework by re-branding the 
problem as “violence in households”.
It should be noted that, despite the achievements of the movements 
under investigation in this paper, the discourses at European level on 
multiculturalism, social integration, and equal opportunities have tended 
to appear in Hungarian public consciousness only after their translation 
into Hungarian. This in itself is a Hungarian political paradox, given 
that the conservative party has made successful use of the rhetoric of 
anti-establishment social movements in other countries and disposes 
of the means to do so. A good example of this is the OWS movement, 
where the issues were not really new, but the dynamics were different. 
In the case oiH aH a, we see that its development has been significantly
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influenced by the experiences of movements in other countries, even 
though international issues were not the subject-matter of its protests. 
The case of Milla does have an international perspective, for media 
independence and the application in the EU  countries of the democratic 
norms formulated in the Copenhagen Criteria have featured in its 
various protests and are unavoidable. It remains an interesting and open 
question whether and to what extent Hungary’s domestic movements will 
be influenced in their development by initiatives elsewhere in Europe 
that have taken up the fight against corruption and social tensions. As far 
as the leftist and liberal women’s movements are concerned, the question 
is not only the manner in which they can represent international norms 
(such as gender equality), but also how they evaluate and react to the 
fact that their political influence has not grown in the post-1989 period, 
even while gender inequality has increased to unprecedented levels in 
all fields.
The conservative women’s movement, with its focus on the primacy 
of the family and its denial of freedom of choice and structural 
discrimination, has found a rival in the field of women’s politics. Far- 
right fundamentalist gender politics, also based on the politics of care 
and placing the family in the centre, seeks in the long run to absorb the 
political space for conservative women’s politics, while uniting all these 
political forces under the rhetoric of hostility to communist oppression. 
This is evidenced by the award given to a neo-Nazi journalist by the 
conservative women’s umbrella organization. The rhetoric of progress, 
the concept of a “New Woman” is being appropriated by anti-modernist 
political forces. This rhetoric of the victorious neoconservative politics 
after 1989 has left the emancipatory leftists in a defensive position, as 
their rhetoric is a defensive and negative one. Having failed to critique 
the basis of neoliberal politics, it remains the prisoner of progress.
This is a particularly important point in the aftermath of the economic 
crisis with increased competition among the nation-states in terms of their 
economic models and when the absurd solutions of Hungary’s so-called 
unorthodox economic policies -  solutions such as the nationalization of 
state pensions and government price-fixing in the public utility sector 
(measures that call into question the basic and necessary premises of 
liberal democracy and the market economy) -  are applied by other 
European countries in the hope of resolving the crisis.
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Locality is usually not conceptualized as a major space for rethinking 
politics, no matter that this is the basis of representational politics. 
Progressive intellectuals, like Cas Mudde among others, are still prisoners 
to the aufklarist/enlightenmcnt paradigm that intellectuals should “spill 
down” their ideas to the society and build up class consciousness (Mudde 
2013). M udde is right that pol itical parties are not up to the task of creating 
a new identity politics, as they are products and representatives of an 
old-identity politics regime. The future will tell us whether reinventing 
locality in the age of identity politics in the Hungarian national context, 
together with new movements, can change political parties as institutions 
of representation.
It seems, at present, that the success or failure of the model established 
in response to the crisis that arose out of the response to globalization 
and to Hungary’s exemplary transition, will not depend on the application 
of norms derived from social reactions. Rather, people will base their 
judgment on whether or not the social crisis is overcome, which in itself 
bears the possibility of a new kind of long-term political model, which 
Kim Schepele has referred to as the development of the Frankenstate.
References
liekemmet utăn lăsertetjărăs: fantomok es älcivüek kampânyolnak Bajnai eilen, 2012, Available 
from: < http://atlatszo.hu/2012/ll/27/bekemenet-utan-kisertetiaras-fantomszervezetek-kampa 
nyolnak-bajnai-ellen> [27 November 2012].
Boda, Z  & Csigo, P 2012, ‘Dismantled Democracy, Ungovernable Country: The Derailment of 
Hungary in the 2000s and Prospects for a Democratic Recover’, Paper for Boell Foundation. 
Available from: Boel Fund Portal [3 January 2014].
Crouch, C 2004, Post-democracy, Polity Press, Cambridge-Malden.
Fclslri, R 1995, 77ic Gender o f Modernity, MA: Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 
FES-Policy Solutions 2012, O knem szavaznak ma Magyarorszagon. Available from: <http://www.
policysolutions.hu/userfiIes/elemzesek/Nemszavaz%C3%B3k%20Magy arorsz%C3%A- 
lgon.pdf> [20 November 2013],
Hogyan kesziilt? A  T'orradalom, 2012. Available from: < http://hallgatoihalozat.blog.hu/2012/12/’ 
26/_hogyan_keszult_aJdrradalom> [26December 2012j.
Ipsos 2013, Javult a közhangulat, több a titkolozo. Available from: < http://www.ipsos.hu/site/jav 
ult-a-k-zhangulat-t-bb-a-titkol-z/>  [18 November 2013].
Krastev, 12013, ‘Legközelebb hol? Vagy legközelebb micsoda?’ in: Tarka ettenâUăs. Kezikönyv re- 
belliseknek es bdkeseknek, eds P Krastev & J van Til. Napvilâg Kiado, Budapest, pp. 160-179.
Light, D  2000, ‘Gazing on Communism: heritage tourism and post-communist identities in Ger­
many, Hungary and Romania’, Tourism Geographies, vol. 2, no. 2, pp, 157-176.
Miszlivetz, F 2012, Ä  demokrâcia es a civil târsadalom âtalakitâsa a globâlis terben’, Civil Szem- 
le, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 63-82.
74 Andrea Petö, Zoltân Vasali
Mudde, C 2013, Nothing left? In search o f (a new) social democracy. Available from: < http:// 
www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/cas-mudde/nothing-left-in-search-of-new-so- 
cial-democracy> [4 January 2014].
Nöszövetsdgnek âlcâzott nosimogatö miniszterreL, nd. Available from: < http://blackfiag.blog. 
hu/2014/01/01/nacisimogato> [4 January 2014],
Petö, A 2012, ‘Far-Right Movements and Gender Mobilisation in Hungary’, Queries, vol. 3, 
pp. 130-138.
Petö, A 2010, Anti-Modemist Political Thoughts on Motherhood in Europe in a Historical 
Perspective’ in: Reframing Demographic Change in Europe. Perspectives on Gender and 
Welfare State Transformations, ed H  Kahlert & W Ernst, Focus Gender. Band 11. Lit Verlag, 
Berlin, pp. 189-201.
Petöcz, G 2012a, A  Milla-erzes -  elsö resz. Available from: < http://magyamarancs.hu/belpol/a- 
-milla-erzes-elso-resz-82162> [19 October 2012].
Petöcz, G 2012b, A  Milla-erzes -  elsöresz (2). Available from: < http://magyarnarancs.hu/belpo- 
l/a-milla-erzes-masodik-resz-82164> [20 October 2012].
Pogâtsa, Z  2013, Rendszervăltăs tärsadalom nelkül Available from: < http://www.parameter.sk/ 
blog/pogatsa-zoltan/2013/12/29/rendszervaltas-tarsadalom-nelkul> [23 December 2013]. 
Szabo, F 2012, Mit akar a Hallgatöi Hâlozat? Available from: < http://eduline.hu/felsookta-
tas/2012/l/20/Hallgatoi_Halozat_felsooktatasi_toiveny_ell BAQRF5> [20 January 2012].
Wirth, Z  2013, A  magyar fiatalok befordultak es lapüanak. Available from: < http://www.ongo. 
hu/itthon/20130918-magyar-ifjusag-2012-kutatas-lapitanak-es-magukba-fordulnak-a-mag- 
yar-fiatalok.html > [18 October 2013].
